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Proses pengolahan gas di Plant SBN adalah sebuah pabrik yang mempunyai bahaya cukup tinggi. Kandungan gas alam yang didalamnya terdapat gas atau matcri pengotor seperti H2O, C02, H28 dan pengotor lainnya akan menyebabkan peralatan cepat mengalami kerusakan (teijadi korosi, penipisan dan retak). I-Iasil dari prosess produksi berupa gas, kondensaie dan sisa air produksi mempunyai tingkat bahaya yang berbeda. Disamping itu apabila gas tersebut bocor atau keluar dan terpapar ierhadap pekerja atau lingkungan dapat berakibat fatal. Penelitian ini berupa penilaian resiko yang bersifat analitis deslcritif dengan melakukan analisa dan perhitungan kemungkinan kegagalan Qorobability offailure-POP) dan tingkat keparahan dari suatu kegagalan (consequence of failure-COD dari suatu kejadian terhadap 6 buah tangki timbnm di Plant SBN dengan mengunakan prinsip standar API 581 qualitative risk assessment berupa label checklist. Berdasarkan hasil perhitungan factor proability of failure (POP) dan consequence of failure (COF) disimpulkan bahwa tingkat rcsiko 6 buah tangki timbun yang ada di Plant SBN adalah sebagai berikut: tangki condensate 235-T-101A dan 235-T-101B mempunyai tingkat nesiko "tinggi"; tangki condensate 235-T-201 mempunyai tingkat resiko "medium-tinggi"; tangki diesel fuel 247-T-101, produce water 258-T-101 dan 258-T-201 mempunyai tingkat reslko "rendah". Damage Factor dan Inspection Factor mempakan falctor kontribusi dominan dalam perhimngan kemunglcinan kegagalan sedangkan Chemical Factor, Quantity Factor, Auto Ignition Factor, Pressure Factor, dan Credit Factor (S'cy@ty Protection) merupakan faktor kontribusi dominan dalam perhitungan konsekwensi kegagalan pada ke-6 buah tangki tezsebut selama proses peuilaian resiko.
Gas refinery process at SBN Plant is a plant which contains hazardous material/fluid during its process. Natural gas composition as hydrocarbon contains impurities such as HQO, CO2, H23 and other particles, which may cause equipment damage (including corrosion, thinning or cracking). A product from gas refinery is gas, condensate and produce water which they have difference hazards characteristic. However if there is gas or condensate leaking or exposed to employees or environment, it can lead a worst event. This research is to perform risk assessment using descriptive analysis approach by calculating and analyzing the probability of failure (POF) and consequence of failure (COF) at 6 (six) storage tanks at SBN Plant by using API 581 Standard as qualitative risk assessment approach with checklist table. Results suggested that probability of failure (POF) and consequence of failure (COF) factors are as follows: condensate tanks 235-T-101A and 235-T-101B have risk ranking "high"; condensate tank 235-T-201 has risk ranking "medium-high" (significant risk); diesel fuel tank 247-T-101, produce water tank 258-T-101 and 258-T-201 have risk ranking "low". Damage Factor and Inspection Factor are dominant contributing factors in probability of failure calculation and Chemical Factor, Quantity Factor, Auto Ignition Factor, Pressure Factor, Credit Factor (Safety Protection) are dominant contributing factors for consequences of failure calculation for 6 (six) storage tanks during risk assessment process.
Along with the development of the world's industry and since the beginning of theindustrial revolution, the world is never be separated from the use of chemicals. Oneof the chemicals used is hydrogen chloride/hydrochloric acid which is the rawmaterial of plastic PVC, furniture cleaning materials, to produce gelatin, foodaddictive substances, and the leather tanning process, so the risk of HCL is very large.There is no exception for the tank material as the place to store materials. Therefore,it is very necessary need the level risk assessment in design phase HCl 33% storagetank againts tank material and financial consequences aspects if there is a leak at thetank.In this study, the analysis of the risk assessment used the Quantitative Risk AnalysisMethode API-RBI 581:2008. This study shows that the value of Probability ofFailure (PoF) obtained is 3909,24 and is on category 5 (1000 < Df-total ≤10000), ifthere is a hole in the wall of the tank its cost of consequence is US$ 8.670.000, oncategory D and at the high level risk. While the cost of consequence if there is a holeat the plate of bottom tank is US$ 21.500.000.000 and is on category E and at thehigh risk level.Keywords : Storage tank, Ammonia, dispersion, BREEZE Incident analyst, FaultTree Analysis
This study assess the consequences of the chemical release from the pressurized Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) storage tank at PT. LMI. This study is kuantitative. Simulation of release using ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Athmospheres) software based on primary and secondary datas on the normal operation. ALOHA give result in a distance range of dispersion, fire and explosion. Each distance range is classified into three categories: red, orange and yellow based on the level of severity. These study's result is indicate that schools, medical clinic, factories, and homes around PT. LMI being the high-risk population affected by the release of chemicals from the LPG storage tank.
WT16 Solvent storage tank has a potential fire risk because this tank contain flammable liquid solvent. Even though, there is no record that this case ever happens in Indonesia. But, fire risk assessment is the essential activities that need to do for chemical industry, petrochemical industry or any other industry that use hydrocarbon in their industrial activity. The method used for this paper is descriptive method with secondary data about the storage tank. This paper use qualitative risk assessment result that fire risks for WT16 the storage tank is high. Then based on the calculation of the ALOHA software in getting the results of the thermal radiation in tank number 3 have 71 meters with 10 Kw/m2 intensity of radiation, 97 meters with 5 Kw/m2 intensity of radiation, 147 meter with Kw/m2 intensity of radiation and for tank number 2 have 68 meters with 10 Kw/m2 intensity of radiation, 94 meters with 5 Kw/m2 intensity of radiation, 142 meters with 2 Kw/m2 intensity of radiation. Then, a safe distance by calculating using the acceptable separation distance calculator results obtained within safe for humans 179, 16 meters and 35.38 meters for buildings for tank number 3 and for the tank number 2 the safe distance is at 128, 60 meters for humans and 24, 48 feet for the building.
All risk management activities always focus on activities to reduce or minimize risks. Many risk analysis methods are used when applying risk management in work-related activities Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) analysis is one of the semi-quantitative risk analysis methods in risk management aimed at reducing or reducing risk by formulating a protective layer that will be used to reduce the risk level. LOPA is determined by three main factors, namely: Scenario Determination, Initiating Event Selection, and Independent Protection Layer Selection. PT X and PT Y are one of the chemical process industries selected for their LOPA study. The background of the election of PT X and PT Y is because both companies have similar characteristics to the burning fuel terminal in Buncefield tragedy The results showed that the risk reduction of both companies was different, although the scenario and the Independent Layer Protection (IPL) involved were identical. This difference is because both companies have different rules of IPL treatment program. PT X has a more stringent treatment program regulation than PT Y. All programs aimed at maintaining customs will increase the risk reduction value by a factor of 10. Validation and ITPM (Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance) is one of the steps that can be used to enlarge the Risk Reduction of LOPA study results.
